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The September G-5 Meeting and Its Impact
The dollar has declined dramatically since the Sep-
tember 22 meeting ofthe so-called "Group of
Five" orG-5 countries ~. which consists of France,
Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The G-5 meets
informally to discuss sensitive international mone-
tary problems. A communique issued afterthe
meeting prominently discussed group efforts to
resist protectionism and to improve the interna-
tional coordination of macroeconomic policies, but
markets have tended to focus on aspects involving
official foreign exchange market intervention. This
Letterexamines the G-5 communique and dis-
cusses some ofthe subsequent developments, par-
ticularly with regard to the exchange value of the
dollar.
The G-5 communique
In their communique, the G-5 countries stated that
policy initiatives takeh by them had led to agreater
convergence of economic performance across
their countries. But, they added, exchange markets
had not fully reflected recent changes in the coun-
tries' fundamental economic conditions and their
policy commitments for the future.
Against this background, the participants commit-
ted themselves to policies that would provide bal-
anced noninflationary growth and more open
markets, as well as policies that would further
reduce government budget deficits in countries
where they were deemed to be too high. They also
stated that, given the change in fundamentals such
as output growth and interest rates, "... some
further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar
currencies against the dollar is desirable. They
stand ready to cooperate more closely to
encourage this when itwould be helpful to do SO."
In the specific policy statements contained in the
communique, all five countries agreed to resist pro-
tectionism. In addition, France, Germany and the
United Kingdom stated that they would reduce
taxes. France, Germany, Japan and the United
Kingdom said they would work toward making
financial markets more efficient, and Germany and
the U.K. added that they would review policies
affecting labor markets. The French, German, Bri-
tish and American representatives also stated that
they would reduce the share of the public sector in
their economies.
In view of the subsequent developments discussed
below, it is also noteworthy that, in the individual
statements made by each country, onlyJapan
mentioned exchange rates explicitly. Part of the
Japanese statement reads, "... the governmentof
Japan will. .. (pursue)... Flexible management of
monetary policy with due attention to the yen
rate./I
Overall, then, two issues appear to stand out in the
G-5 agreement. First, there is the question of what
macroeconomic policy initiatives the G-5 countries
will undertake and the extentto which such initia-
tives will be coordinated with one another. The
second issue concerns the extenttowhich
exchange market intervention will be employed to
re-align currency values.
International policy coordination
In examining the policy measures outlined in the
communique as well as the subsequent steps
undertaken by the G-5 countries, it is instructive to
consider the conditions of their economies in the
period preceding the release ofthe communique.
The discussion of steps to improve labor market
efficiency by Britain and Germany is understand-
able since the gradual increase in their unemploy-
ment rates despite relatively healthy GNP growth
rates suggests that their labor markets suffer from
structural problems. Inflation rates in France over
the past year or so have tended to be higher than
those in the other G-5 countries, so the French
have stated that they will pursue monetary targets
consistent with decelerating inflation.
The Japanese economy has been doing considera-
bly betterthan the others in terms of both output
and employment. However, to a substantial
extent, its relative success has been due to strong
growth in exports. Thus, measures announced by
Japan shortly afterthe meeting are meant to lead
to more open domestic markets and to stimulateFRBSF
domestic demand. The latter set of measures is
aimed at boosting private spending on housing,
increasing spending by local governmentsand by
natural gas .and electric companies, andat making
itsomewhat easier for consumers to obtain credit.
However, it should be pointed out that these
measures were plannedeven before the Septem-
ber22 meeting. Furthermore, analysts have
stated that this set of measures will not have a sub-
stantial impacton japanese domestic demand.
No significant new policy initiatives have been
announced by the Europeanmembers of the G-5
after the meeting. German officials have subse-
quentlystated that the September 22 meeting
would not lead to any change in their current fiscal
policy. They declined to speed up the implementa-
tion oftax cuts originally scheduled for1986 and
early 1988. Some observers have been considera-
bly pessimistic about the prospects for fiscal policy
coordination among the G-5 countries, stating that
thecountries are unlikely to coordinate policies
overa sustained period because this would mean
sacrificing their domestic macro-policy objectives.
Why are the European countries C\pparently not
eager to stimulatetheir domestic economies, given
their recent progress against inflation andcontinu-
ing problems with unemployment? Expansionary
monetary policy is ruled out by the fact that it is
likely to lead to adecline in the value of their cur-
rencies against the dollar. The resistance to a more
expansionaryfiscal policy may arise because of a
growingconviction that a large government sector
imposes costs upon the economy. Increases in
governmentspending without tax increases will
lead to large deficits that are likely to raise interest
rates, whereas increases in government spending
matched by highertaxes will tend to discourage
investment as well as labor efforts.
In this context, itshould be noted that the ratio of
total government expenditure (which includes
central and local governments and social security
institutions) to GNP is already at least a third as
high again for the European members of the G-5
countries as it is for the u.s, Among the G-5 coun-
tries, France had the highest proportion ofgovern-
ment expenditures to GNP in 1984 __ 52.4 percent
versus 34.3 percent for the u.s.
Intervention and the dollar's value
Based onthe events discussed above, the consen-
sus among financial market analysts appears to be
that the only new thing to have come out of the
G-5meeting is the increased emphasis on foreign
exchange market intervention. Foreign exchange
traders have stated that the central banks ofthe
G-5 countries have intervened on several occasions
since the September 22 agreement. The behavior
of the dollar sincethen is shown in the chart. (The
effective exchange rate index shown in the chart is
a bilateral trade-weighted index. This index selects
those countries with which the U.s. has the largest
total trade - value ofexports plus imports - and
assigns weights to the dollar exchange rates of
their currencies in proportion to their shares in U.s.
bilateral trade during a base period,) Notice that
the dollardeclined by approximately 4 percent the
next day - the largest one-day decline in the
floating exchange rate era.
The central banks of the G-5 countries are reported
to have intervened heavily immediately after the
communique was released. Foreign exchange
traders report that substantial intervention also
took place during the middle of October, when the
dollar appeared to be strengthening somewhat. In
that episode, central banks took advantage of the
weaker-than-expected third quarter U.5.GNP
figures which were released on the 17thof
October.
Dollar-yen rate
The chart also plots the value of the dollar against
the currencies of the other G-5 countries. An
interesting fact evident in the chart is that the dol-
lar has fallen most against the yen. A combination
of dollar sales and policy announcements by
japanese officials have succeeded in driving the
dollar down more than 15 percent against the yen.
For instance, in the last week of October,a state-
ment by the Governor of the Bank ofjapan that he
favored higher interest rates was reported to have
sent japanese bond yields up more than 50 basis
points. The three-month Euro-yen rate, which had
remained at a near constant 6.30 - 6.50 percent for
at least two years, has increased from 6.44 percent
on October18to 8.06 percent on November15.
Similarly, in the first week of November, when the
Governor made a statement saying the yen should
climb higher, the yen rose by 2.5 percent against
the dollar in a 24-hour period. The 15 percent de-
cline in the value of the dollar against the yen from
September 22 to November20 compares with aExchange Value of the Dollar
September 20, 1985 = 100
fall in the trade~weightedvalue of the dollar of 6.6
percentover the same period.
• Asingle line is used to represent the value of the dollar against both the
West German mark and the French franc because these two European
currencies have moved very closely together over the period shown.
Even if intervention has played an important role in
reducing the value of the dollar since the agree-
ment, there still remains the question of how effec-
tive intervention can be in the long-run. In the
short-run, intervention creates considerable uncer-
tainty in the foreign exchange markets as traders
try to guess when and how strongly the central
banks will intervene. Because the risk is that the
dollar will decline, market participants may
postpone purchases of dollars. But should the fear
that central banks will intervene subside, the
demand for dollars will increase and, other things
remaining the same, the dollar mightappreciate
somewhat. As such, unless the recent intervention
is seen as implying an increase in the central banks'
willingness to intervene on acontinuing basis, the
immediate impact is likely to be considerably larger
than the long-run impact.
ness has been mounting. Furthermore, real interest
rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of
the world have narrowed. It is difficult, however, to
determine the relative significance of these
developments for the decline in the dollar.
Market participants are becoming convinced that
short-term measures, such as intervention, have
achieved about as much as they are likely to. They
feel that further adjustments in the exchange value
of the dollar can be brought about only by chang-
ing fundamental economic conditions. In particu-
lar, they believe the time has come for the u.s. to
take steps to reduce its federal budget deficit and
for theJapanese and, perhaps, European govern-
ments to stimulate their economies through signifi-
cant tax or expenditure changes. In the absence of
such measures, we may already have seen the
maximum impact of the decisions made at the C-S
meeting.
A numberof studies have shown that the effects
of intervention alone are transitory at best. Longer
run movements in exchange rates appear to be
determined by fundamentals such as interest rate
differentials. Thus, in the long-run, the effects of
the C-S meeting may depend crucially on the
extent to which it leads to important changes in
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As mentioned above, the dollar has dropped by
more than 6 percent since the C-S announcement.
While intervention may have been an important
influence, it is likely that other factors have played
important roles as well. In particular, over the past
year or so, evidence of the U.S. economy's weak-
In this context, it should also be noted that market
participants generally agree that one of themajor
(if notthe primary) motivations for the C-S agree-
mentwas to reduce the mounting protectionist
pressures in the U.s., especially those in relation to
Japan. As of now, the C-S agreement appears to
have been at least partially successful.
Because of these developments, market analysts
have become convinced that the C-S agreement
and the subsequent intervention have been
directed primarily towards reducing the value of
the dollaragainst the yen. Shortly after the com-
munique was issued, one observer interpreted the
C-S agreement as evidence that the other C-S
countries had been successful in pressuring Japan
to make efforts to reduce its trade surplus (both via
monetary and fiscal policy).
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 197,218 - 11 10,032 5.3
Loans and Leases1 6 178,852 429 10,325 6.1
Commercial and Industrial 51,249 46 - 1,109 - 2.1
Real estate 65,640 68 4,113 6.6
Loans to Individuals 37,804 - 10 6,975 22.6
Leases 5,416 18 365 7.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,127 - 475 - 573 - 4.8
Other Securities2 7,239 35 281 4.0
Total Deposits 200,774 - 2,087 9,549 4.9
Demand Deposits 48,697 - 1,695 4,038 9.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 32,825 1,031 4,528 16.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,252 - 176 1,850 14.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,826 - 216 3,661 2.7
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 45,804 35 6,114 15.4
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000or more 37,889 - 663 - 2,854 - 7.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 24,497 355 283 1.1
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephonetransfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change